Processing Topics from the Beneficial Cognitive Model in Partially and Over-Successful Persuasion Dialogues by Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska
Processing Topics from the Beneficial Cognitive Model
in Partially and Over-Successful Persuasion Dialogues
Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska
Published online: 19 July 2014
 The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract A persuasion dialogue is a dialogue in which a conflict between agents
with respect to their points of view arises at the beginning of the talk and the agents
have the shared, global goal of resolving the conflict and at least one agent has the
persuasive aim to convince the other party to accept an opposing point of view. I argue
that the persuasive force of argument may have not only extreme values but also
intermediate strength. That is, I wish to introduce two additional types of the effects of
persuasion in addition to successful and unsuccessful ones (cf. Van Eemeren and
Houtlosser in Argumentation 14(3):293–305, 2000; Advances in pragma-dialectics.
Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2002; Walton in A pragmatic theory of fallacy. University of
Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1995; Walton and Krabbe in Commitment in dialogue:
basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. State University of New York Press,
Albany, New York, 1995). I propose a model which provides for modified versions of
the standpoint of an agent needed in order to bring about two possible outcomes of a
persuasion dialogue. These two outcomes I label partially-successful and over-suc-
cessful. I call the potential, not yet verbalised, standpoint of an agent here the original
topic t. Based on some aspects of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson in Relevance:
communication and cognition. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; Wilson and Sperber in The
handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006), I explain that the
modified version of the original topic t is an implicature created from the original topic
t and from a specific mental topic which belongs to, what I call the beneficial cognitive
model (hence BCM). I define BCMi,t as a set of topics which are within the area of
agent i’s interest of persuasion with respect to t.
A comment to this article is available at doi:10.1007/s10503-014-9317-3.
K. Debowska-Kozlowska (&)
Department of Pragmatics of English, Faculty of English, Adam Mickiewicz University, al.





Keywords Persuasion  Persuasive force of argument  Success  Goal  Relevance
theory  Mental topic  Cognition
1 Introduction
Actual communication practice is the point of departure for the model presented in this
paper. The paper is rooted in the programme of the Polish School of Argumentation
which is inspired by the pragma-linguistic and cognitive aspects (see Kopytko 2002; Cap
2010) of argument force in communication practice. This paper proposes to consider a
specific type of dialogue called a persuasion dialogue in which two participants have
opposing points of view on a certain issue. The notion of a point of view is defined here in
pragma-dialectical terms and is described as ‘‘a certain positive or negative position with
respect to a proposition’’ (van Eemeren 2001: 17). Participants in this specific type of
dialogue act as proponent and opponent. A proponent of a particular point of view adopts
a positive position with respect to a certain proposition. The opponent of the point of view
challenges the positive position of the proponent or expresses a counter attitude to that
position. If the opponent only questions the proponent’s position, without defending a
thesis of his own, then he becomes engaged in a non-mixed dispute. If the opponent
expresses his own position with respect to a proposition, then he becomes involved in a
mixed dispute (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 17). In this article, the proponent
and the opponent are named agent i and agent i’ respectively.
I define a persuasion dialogue as a dialogue in which a conflict between agents
with respect to their points of view arises at the beginning of the talk and the agents
have the shared, global goal of resolving the conflict. Furthermore, as part of this
definition, at least one agent has the persuasive aim to convince the other party to
accept an opposing point of view (cf. Walton 1995; Walton and Krabbe 1995). I
claim that an agent has a persuasive aim if he is interested only in such an outcome
of a dialogue in which his position wins. My perspective on persuasion relies on its
socio-psychological definition which treats it as ‘‘a successful intentional effort at
influencing another’s mental state through communication’’ (O’Keefe 2002: 5).
The main aim of this paper is to introduce a supplementary model which
distinguishes types of persuasion effects in addition to the ones discussed in the
pragma-dialectical critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002; van
Eemeren 2009) and the Waltonian persuasion dialogue (1995; Walton and Krabbe
1995). Both of those approaches allow the analyst to identify two types of effects:
fully successful persuasion and fully unsuccessful persuasion. They propose systems
describing the course of a dialogue in which the standpoint of an agent is introduced
in advance and is not changed during the dialogue. The term ‘‘standpoint’’ is
considered here in pragma-dialectical terms. ‘‘Standpoint’’ is defined as ‘‘(…)
individual expression of someone’s subjective opinion (…), a public statement put
forward for acceptance by a listener or reader who is assumed not to share the
speaker or writer’s point of view’’ (Houtlosser 2001: 31).
The model I propose here provides for modified versions of the standpoint of an
agent during one dialogue and introduces two additional types of effects of
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persuasion: partially successful dialogue and over-successful dialogue (cf. Bud-
zynska and Debowska 2010).1 The normative reason for adding these two nuances
of success is to give the proponent his due after he has partially or excessively made
his case. I claim that a certain mental conception in the mind of an agent, which I
call in this paper the original topic t, might become his standpoint when publicly
expressed in a persuasion dialogue.2
The secondary aim of the paper is to see how a certain modified version of the
original topic t is generated in the mind of an agent and why that version of topic t
has a decisive function in describing partially successful persuasion and over-
successful persuasion. Based on some aspects of relevance theory (Sperber and
Wilson 1986; Wilson 1994, 2000; Wilson and Sperber 2006), I explain that the
modified version of the original topic t is an implicature created from the original
topic t and from a specific mental topic which belongs to, what I call the beneficial
cognitive model (hence BCM).3 I define BCMi,t as a set of ‘‘beneficial’’ topics with
respect to t which are within the area of agent i’s interest of persuasion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows how the persuasive aim is
considered in the models of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion and Waltonian
persuasion dialogue, and what type of a criterion is provided by those models to
evaluate the persuasive force of argument in terms of its successfulness. The paper
also seeks to show that the criterion of acceptance or rejection of an agent’s point of
view by the other party does not apply to the assessment of dialogues in which types
of persuasion other than those fully successful or fully unsuccessful are intuitively
recognised. Section 3 elaborates on the notion of topic t and introduces the notion of
the set of other topics Ti,t = {t1,…,tn} which helps agent i resolve the difference
between his and the other party’s point of view. Using the aspects of relevance
theory, Sect. 3 shows how the set of other topics Ti,t = {t1,…,tn} is activated in the
mind of agent i during a dialogue. Section 4 explains that the BCM is a subset of
Ti,t, but involves only the topics which help agent i realise his persuasive intention.
Section 5 shows that only the topics from BCMi,t might help to generate the
modified version of topic t needed for obtaining partially-successful and over-
successful persuasion dialogues. Finally, Sect. 6 discusses some selected features of
partially-successful and over-successful persuasion dialogues.
2 Persuasive Aim in the Standard Models
The representatives of the pragma-dialectical school of argumentation (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002; van Eemeren 2009) and Walton (1995; Walton
1 In (Budzynska and Debowska 2010), I discuss over-success in the case of dialogues with conflict
resolution using the notions of ‘degree of importance’ and ‘degree of acceptance’.
2 Clearly, a mental conception of topic t cannot be evaluated as true or false or acceptable or
unacceptable because it functions only as a proposition under consideration. However, when it becomes
verbalised in the form of a statement it might be evaluated in this way.
3 See (Budzynska and Witek 2014) for another example of a pragmatic approach to argumentation.
While my approach relies on relevance theory, theirs relies on the theory of speech acts.
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and Krabbe 1995) discuss the persuasive aim4 of an agent and provide a criterion for
its successful achievement. In the pragma-dialectical advanced model of a critical
discussion, the persuasive aim is discussed in relation to the dialectical aim. Van
Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000, 2002; van Eemeren 2009, see also Debowska et al.
2009: 122–123) introduce the concept of ‘strategic manoeuvring’ when discussing
the employment of reasonable argumentation achieved by maintaining a balance
between the simultaneous pursuit of the persuasive and dialectical aim. Pragma-
dialecticians indicate that disputants may simultaneously pursue the persuasive aim
of making the strongest case and the dialectical aim of the resolution of the
difference of opinion. In pragma-dialectics, a persuasive aim is concerned with the
intention of an individual agent to have his own point of view accepted. As van
Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002:15) emphasise, ‘‘rhetorical considerations [in a
critical discussion] relate to the contextual adjustment of argumentation to the
people that are to be convinced’’.
Walton (1995), Walton and Krabbe (1995) discuss the persuasive aim of an agent
within the model of a persuasion dialogue and relate it to the notion of commitments
(cf. Kacprzak and Yaskorska, this issue). They indicate that the individual aim of
each agent in this type of dialogue is ‘‘to persuade others to take over its point view’’
(Walton and Krabbe 1995: 68). Walton (1995: 18–19) treats a critical discussion as
a subspecies of a persuasion dialogue. As Walton (1995: 100) indicates, ‘‘the critical
discussion is a much more specific and precisely regulated type of dialogue [than a
persuasion dialogue] that has all kinds of specific rules defining what a participant
may or may not do at any given stage [of the dialogue]’’. The Waltonian model
centres on the commitments of the other party. Commitments are said to be ascribed
to propositions when an agent publicly declares them as his beliefs, attitudes,
intentions, plans, preferences, etc. (cf. Walton 1995; Searle 1970; Hamblin 1970;
Katriel and Dascal 1989; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004; van Eemeren
and Houtlosser 2004). Walton (1995) emphasises that an agent realises his
persuasive aim by trying to determine what will successfully persuade the other
party by tracking the other party’s commitments.
In both the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and the Waltonian
model of a persuasion dialogue, the acceptance or rejection of an agent’s point of
view by the other party is a criterion for deciding whether persuasion has been
successful or unsuccessful. If the opponent changes his point of view or his stance
towards the proponent’s thesis at the end of the dialogue, then persuasion is
evaluated as successful for the proponent. If at the end of the dialogue the opponent
does not change his point of view or his stance towards the proponent’s thesis, then
persuasion is evaluated as unsuccessful for the proponent.
Below I present two brief examples of dialogue 1 and 2 to show that the criterion
provided by the standard models permits the identification of fully successful
persuasion and fully unsuccessful persuasion but not the nuances of partially
4 See (Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2007) for the cognitive processing of a goal in which beliefs and desires
are perceived as pre-stages.
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successful and over-successful persuasion.5 Since dialogue 1 and 26 are to serve as
quick ways of showing what I mean by partial and over-success there is not too
much elaboration of their argumentative content.
Consider dialogue 1 in which partially successful persuasion is intuitively
observed:
John_1 Please lend me a 100 euro note.
Ann_2 No, I can’t. I have got only a 50 euro note.
John_3 OK, in that case I can take 50 euros.
Ann_4 OK.
Intuitively, partially successful persuasion has been achieved in dialogue 1 because
John has not persuaded Ann to lend him 100 euros, but he will get part of the
amount he wanted. The proposition which John defends in move John_1 can be
reconstructed as ‘‘You should give me a 100 euro note’’. Move John_1 can also be
read as a full argument: ‘‘You should give me a 100 euro note, because I need 100
euros and you possibly have a 100 euro note’’. The proposition defended by John in
move John_3 is ‘‘You should give me a 50 euro note’’. Turn 3 can also be read as a
full argument ‘‘You should give me a 50 euro note, because I need 50 euros and you
have a 50 euro note.’’ Relying on standard models of conflict resolution we cannot,
however, describe this type of dialogue as partially successful persuasion. Pragma-
dialecticians would probably reconstruct the dialogue as a multiple dispute in which
two standpoints are defended and one of these (‘‘I think you should give a 100 euro
note’’) is abandoned at some point, and the second one (i.e. ‘‘I think you should give
me a 50 euro note’’) is won by John. From the Waltonian perspective, the dialogue
might be considered a situation where John comes up with a new standpoint (i.e. ‘‘I
think you should give me a 50 euro note’’) at some point in the dialogue, and instead
of retracting the earlier thesis (i.e. ‘‘You should give a 100 euro note’’), he starts
defending the new thesis.
Even if only one standpoint were considered by pragma-dialectians and Walton
(i.e. ‘‘I think you should give a 100 euro note’’) in the reconstruction of dialogue 1,
then still the pragma-dialectical and Waltonian criterion of achieving success by
convincing the other party to accept the opposing point view would not be fulfilled.
Ann has not been persuaded to give John a 100 euro note. Since John has not
achieved his original aim of borrowing a 100 euro note, the dialogue would be
evaluated as a fully unsuccessful persuasion. Still, it is not true that John has gained
5 Numerical representation of the degrees of achieving success has already been discussed by Budzynska
and Kacprzak (2008), Budzynska and Kacprzak (2011), but this paper focuses on non-numerical
representation.
6 Looking at the surface structure of dialogue 1 and 2, it is possible to point out in those dialogues the
features of a negotiation dialogue and the features of a persuasion dialogue. Relying exclusively on the
surface structure of dialogue 1 and 2 it is, therefore, possible to analyse those dialogues in terms of
Walton (1995) mixed dialogues. My aim at this point is, however, to use those dialogues as simple cases
for showing what I mean by partial and over-success. Additionally, it should also be noticed that no
conflict of interest is present in those dialogues; therefore, they could not be reconstructed as pure cases of
a negotiation dialogue. It is the conflict of opinion which allows to reconstruct those dialogues as a
persuasion dialogue.
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nothing. After all, he has convinced Ann of a thesis that seem to be closely related to
his initial thesis.
Consider dialogue 2 in which over-successful persuasion is intuitively observed:
John_1 Please lend me 100 euros.
Ann_2 No, I can’t. I have got only a 200 euro note.
John_3 OK, in that case I can take 200 euros.
Ann_4 OK.
Intuitively, over-successful persuasion has been achieved in dialogue 2 because
John has achieved more than he has wanted, in the sense that he convinced Ann of
his initial thesis and, additionally, he convinced her of the thesis that seem to be
closely related to his initial one. The proposition which John defends in move
John_1 can be reconstructed as ‘‘You should give me a 100 euro note’’. Move
John_1 can also be read as a full argument: ‘‘You should give me a 100 euro note,
because I need 100 euros and you possibly have a 100 euro note’’. The proposition
defended by John in move John_3 is ‘‘You should give me a 200 euro note’’. Turn 3
can also be read as a full argument: ‘‘You should give me a 200 euro note, because I
need 200 euros and you have a 200 euro note.’’ Using the standard models, we
cannot, however, conclude that John has obtained more than he has expected.
Again, pragma-dialecticians would probably reconstruct the dialogue as a multiple
dispute in which two standpoints are defended and one of these (‘‘I think you should
give a 100 euro note’’) is abandoned at some point, and the second one (i.e. ‘‘I think
you should give me a 200 euro note’’) is won by John. From the Waltonian
perspective, it might be recognised as a situation where John comes up with a new
standpoint (i.e. ‘‘I think you should give me a 200 euro note’’) at some point in the
dialogue, and instead of retracting the earlier thesis (i.e. ‘‘You should give a 100
euro note’’), he starts defending the new thesis.
Even if only one standpoint were considered by pragma-dialectians and Walton
(i.e. ‘‘I think you should give a 100 euro note’’) in the reconstruction of dialogue 2,
then we could only evaluate whether or not Ann has been convinced to accept this
initial topic, i.e., that she should give John 100 euros. In such a reconstruction, the
criterion of achieving full success would be fulfilled and therefore the persuasion
would be evaluated as fully successful rather than over-successful, even though
John has gained more money than he has asked for.
3 Notions of Topic, Manifestness and Implicature
In this article, I define the term ‘topic’ as a mental conception in the mind of agent i
or agent i’ which might become any statement, e.g., an assertion, a question, a
standpoint or an argument, when it is publicly expressed. Therefore, the term ‘topic’
does not relate here to the Aristotelian notion of topos (Aristotle 1955; 1959) or
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)’s notion of ‘locus’ which focus on rules and
instructions for creating a link between a standpoint and an argument (c.f. Garssen
2001; Rigotti 2007; Rigotti and Morasso 2010).
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I introduce here a distinction between topic t and other topics (i.e. t1, t2, t3, t4,…,
tn) which might be activated in the mind of agent i during a persuasion dialogue (see
e.g. Kacprzak and Yaskorska (2014, this issue) for the formal way of describing
dialogues). Topic t relates throughout the paper to a potential standpoint. As
mentioned in the introduction, the term ‘standpoint’ is considered here in pragma-
dialectical terms. The term ‘potential’ is applied here to the description of the notion
of standpoint because it does not refer to a verbalised notion. In other words, the
term ‘potential’ means that topic t does not become a real standpoint until certain
commitments are ascribed to it. Thus, topic t is considered a potential, not a real,
standpoint until certain preferences or attitudes with reference to it are publicly
declared by agent i.
It is assumed in the article that a certain mental topic from the set Ti,t needs to be
activated in the mind of agent i to contribute to generating a modified version of
topic t. Relying on the elements of relevance theory introduced by Sperber and
Wilson (1986; Wilson 1994, 2000; Wilson and Sperber 2006, cf. Yus 2006, see also
Walaszewska and Piskorska 2012), I describe below two stages needed for the
activation of a certain mental topic in the mind of agent i. Two notions from
relevance theory are used for the description of the stages: cognitive environment
and manifestness. Subsequently, it is explained how an implicature is created in the
mind of agent i after the activation of the topic from the set Ti,t.
The first stage relates to the expression of an utterance. Agent i needs to hear an
utterance to activate a certain mental topic in his mind. According to relevance
theory, every utterance communicates certain facts and assumptions. After hearing
an utterance, agent i adds the facts and assumptions from the utterance to his
cognitive environment. The relevance-theoretic notion of the cognitive environment
pertains to the set of those facts and assumptions which the hearer has possessed
before a dialogue has started and those which have become available to him during
the dialogue. The cognitive environment involving the set of old facts and
assumptions is treated as the integrated context which helps agent i better
understand the new information. Particular pieces of the information belonging to
the cognitive environment of agent i are manifest to him in different degrees, e.g.,
they might be even less than known or assumed to him. An advocate of relevance
theory, Carston (2002: 378), defines manifestness of an assumption to an individual
as ‘‘the degree to which an individual is capable of mentally representing an
assumption and holding it as true or probably true at a given moment’’. Agent i must
accept a new assumption as true or probably true to adopt it and add it to his
cognitive environment as a manifest assumption.
The second stage refers to the process of activation of a certain topic from the set
Ti,t = {t1,…, tn} by a manifest assumption. Topics from the set Ti,t = {t1,…, tn}
are assumed to be part of the cognitive environment and therefore to have a manifest
status as well. Manifestness of a topic from the set Ti,t is defined here as the degree
to which an agent i is capable of mentally representing the topic and accepting it as
true or probably true. I argue that topic t and topics t1, t2, t3, t4,…, tn from the set
Ti,t are already present in the cognitive environment of agent i before a dialogue
starts or become part of it during the dialogue. The cognitive environment of agent i
consists not only of the topics he is aware of, i.e. topics which he knows are
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advantageous to him because they help him resolve the conflict, but also of the
topics he might become aware of during the dialogue (for example, when raised by
the opposing agent i’) if his cognitive abilities allow for it.7 If the manifest
assumption added to the cognitive environment is identical or similar to a certain
manifest topic from the cognitive environment, then the manifest assumption
activates the certain manifest topic in the mind of agent i.
In a persuasion dialogue, the first, most accessible interpretation of the expressed
utterance called an implicature is created in the mind of agent i. This interpretation
comes about by two processes: (1) the creation of a specific manifest assumption in
the mind of agent i and (2) the activation of a topic from the set Ti,t in the mind of
agent i. Also, the fact that agent i is aware of his standpoint contributes to the
emergence of the implicature from the expressed utterance. Sperber and Wilson
(1986: 194–195) define an implicature8 as ‘‘a contextual assumption or implication
which a speaker, intending her utterance to be manifestly relevant, manifestly
intended to make manifest to the hearer’’. An important aspect of the process of
drawing an implicature in a persuasion dialogue is the fact that the process helps
agent i realise whether an expressed utterance yields to his persuasive advantage.
Section 4 shows which activated topics from the set Ti,t help agent i realise his
persuasive intention.
4 Beneficial Cognitive Model (BCM) as Part of a Cognitive Environment
As explained in Sect. 3, the set Ti,t is a set of topics which are advantageous for
agent i since they help agent i resolve the difference of opinion. In other words, the
set of topics Ti,t = {t1,…,tn} consists of topics which help agent i resolve the
conflict no matter whether he has a persuasive or collaborative or any other
individual aim. I argue that the BCM is part of the set Ti,t. I define BCMi,t as a set
of beneficial topics which help agent i resolve the conflict of opinion but only in his
favour. In other words, topics from BCMi,t help agent i fulfil only his persuasive
aim. Cognitive environment (i.e. CE) is thus a broader conception than the set Ti,t
and the set Ti,t is a broader conception than BCMi,t, i.e. BCMi,t , Ti,t , CE.
7 The set Ti,t = {t1,…, tn} considered in this paper might appear to be close to what van Eemeren et al.
(1993) call disagreement space. Van Eemeren et al. (1993) discuss disagreement space by means of
Searle’s correctness conditions for speech acts. In contrast, the set Ti,t = {t1,…, tn} is not in any way
concerned with the propriety of speech acts in a persuasion dialogue. The set Ti,t = {t1,…, tn} refers to a
set of mental topics in the mind of a proponent which might become any speech acts when publicly
expressed but need to belong to proponent’s interest of conflict resolution.
8 The Gricean view and relevance theory differ in their approaches to the number of stages needed for
implicature’s recognition. Grice (1975, 1989) presents a two-stage approach to implicature’s recognition.
According to him, only after the literal meaning is decoded in the mind of the hearer of an utterance is the
implicature communicated by the speaker recognised. Relevance theory rejects the Gricean view and
proposes to perceive the process of implicature recognition as one stage. According to relevance theory’s
Cognitive Principle of Relevance, ‘‘human cognition tends to be geared to maximization of relevance’’
(Wilson and Sperber 2006: 610). The principle states that a hearer attempts to maximize the relevance of
an expressed utterance and thus considers it in a way which involves the least processing effort from him.
Therefore, a hearer of an utterance arrives at its intended meaning (‘an implicature’) without prior
processing of its literal meaning.
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Not all topics from a Ti,t are thus equally satisfying for agent i in terms of his
persuasive aim. I propose to call the topics belonging only to the BCMi,t and
therefore involving the satisfying, advantageous, salient and essential points for
agent i in terms of his persuasive wants and desires prototype topics and the topics
which are not advantageous for agent i in terms of his persuasive wants and desires
radial topics. The set of topics Ti,t = {t1,…,tn} consists thus of prototype and
radial topics. BCMi,t includes only prototype topics. The inspiration for the use of
the terms ‘prototype’ and ‘radial’ comes from Lakoff (1987). The topics from a
BCM are not, however, in any way concerned with Lakoff’s idea of categorization
of concepts having some universal features. Topics are prototype or radial in terms
of individual gains of agent i during a persuasion dialogue involving a conflict of
opinions.
5 Defining Partially and Over-Successful Persuasion Dialogues
In this section I propose a definition of a partially successful persuasion dialogue
and an over-successful persuasion dialogue. The definitions are provided below:
Partially successful persuasion dialogue for topic t and agent i—a persuasion
dialogue in which agent i and the opposing agent i’ do not agree on the original
topic t but agree on the version of topic t which is logically implied by the original
topic t or pragmatically implicated by the implicit warrant of agent i’s argument and
is generated by the implicature which arises from both t (i.e. the original standpoint
of agent i) and the activated prototype topic from BCMi,t.
Over-Successful persuasion dialogue for topic t and agent i—a persuasion
dialogue in which agent i and the opposing agent i’ agree on the original standpoint
and the version of topic t generated by the implicature which arises from both t (i.e.
the original standpoint of agent i) and the activated prototype topic from BCMi,t.
The version of topic t (the new standpoint) logically implies the truth of the original
standpoint.
The pragmatic implication refers in the first definition to accepting the implicit
warrant of proponent’s argument by an opponent. The version of topic t discussed in
the definitions is treated as a qualified standpoint because in the course of a dialogue
it becomes a variation (a modified version) of the original standpoint on which
agents agree. In the case of a partially successful persuasion dialogue and an over-
successful persuasion dialogue, the qualified standpoint is generated by an
implicature arising from the original standpoint of agent i and a prototype topic
from the BCM of agent i. In partially successful persuasion only a qualified
standpoint needs to be accepted. In over-successful persuasion, both the original and
qualified standpoints need to be accepted.
In Sect. 2 it was indicated that dialogue 1 should be intuitively evaluated as a
partially successful persuasion and dialogue 2 as an over-successful persuasion.
Below it is shown how the new definitions provide for partially and over-successful
persuasion. Consider dialogue 1 again in which partially successful persuasion can
be intuitively recognised:
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John_1 Please lend me a 100 euro note.
Ann_2 No, I can’t. I have got only a 50 euro note.
John_3 OK, in that case I can take 50 euros.
Ann_4 OK.
Let’s say that ‘‘Please lend me a 100 euro note’’ is a verbal manifestation of topic t.
In this dialogue, topic t becomes a standpoint in move John_1 because the positive
attitude to borrowing a 100 euro note from Ann is publicly expressed. If the
definition of partially successful persuasion is to apply in this case, John and Ann
need to agree on the version of topic t generated by the implicature arising from the
original standpoint of John and from a prototype topic from the BCM of John. The
prototype topic needs to be activated in the mind of John by his manifest
assumption. According to relevance theory, after move Ann_2 John creates in his
mind the manifest assumption that Ann is willing to give 50 euros up to him. This
manifest assumption is added to the cognitive environment of John and related to
the BCM of John. If the manifest assumption agrees with a certain prototype topic
from the BCM of John, then the prototype topic is activated. Assume that obtaining
only 50 euros is a satisfying alternative for John, which means that it is the certain
prototype topic belonging to the BCM of John. The manifest assumption that Ann is
willing to give 50 euros up to John and the prototype topic that John wants to obtain
50 euros coincide with each other. The prototype topic activated by the manifest
assumption is added to the information from the cognitive environment about the
content of the standpoint of John and, in this way, the implicature is created in the
mind of John that Ann should lend John a 50 euro note. The implicature is a version
of original topic t. The agreement of both agents on the version of topic t is achieved
in move Ann_4 and the persuasion is thus partially successful for John.9 John will
borrow less money but he will still get part of the amount he originally wanted.
Let us now consider dialogue 2 in which over-successful persuasion is achieved
by agent i:
John_1 Please lend me 100 euros.
Ann_2 No I can’t. I have got only a 200 euro note.
John_3 OK, in that case I can take 200 euros.
Ann_4 OK.
Let’s say that ‘‘Please lend me a 100 euro note’’ is a verbal manifestation of topic t.
In this dialogue, topic t also becomes a standpoint in move John_1 because positive
attitude to borrowing 100 euros from Ann is publicly expressed. According to the
definition of over successful persuasion, John and Ann need to agree on the original
standpoint and on the version of topic t generated by the implicature arising from
9 I agree with Paglieri and Castelfranchi (2010) that non-argumentative, extra-dialogical goals contribute
to the final outcome of argumentation. Dialogical goals can only be a means for achieving extra-
dialogical goals. For example, agent i might want agent i’ to accept his standpoint ‘‘I think you should
give a 100 euro note’’ to achieve an extra-dialogical goal of having another opportunity to meet agent i’
when giving him back the money. Successfulness of dialogical goals should thus be considered with
reference to successfulness of extra-dialogical goals. This paper is to be perceived as a first step towards a




the original standpoint of John and a prototype topic from the BCM of John. The
prototype topic needs to be activated in the mind of John by his manifest
assumption. According to relevance theory, after move Ann_2 John creates in his
mind the manifest assumption that Ann wants to give him 200 euros. This manifest
assumption is added to the cognitive environment of John and related to the BCM of
John. If the manifest assumption agrees with a certain prototype topic from the
BCM of John, then the prototype topic is activated. Assume that obtaining 200 euros
is more satisfying for John than obtaining 100 euros. This means that the 200 euro
acquisition is the certain prototype topic belonging to the BCM of John. The
manifest assumption that Ann wants to give John 200 euros and the prototype topic
that John wants to obtain 200 euros concur. The activated prototype topic is added
to the information from the cognitive environment about the content of the
standpoint of John and, in this way, the implicature is created in the mind of John
that Ann should lend him a 200 euro note. The implicature is a version of original
topic t. The agreement of both agents on the original standpoint and the version of
topic t is achieved in move Ann_4 since John will obtain what he originally wanted
plus some extra money. Thus, the persuasion is over-successful.
As specified in the definition of partially-successful persuasion, the direction-
change of topic t might have to do with logical implication or pragmatic
implication. The pragmatic implication refers in the definition to accepting the
implicit warrant of proponent’s argument by an opponent. In dialogue 1, the implicit
warrant of proponent’s argument is accepted by an opponent. The implicit warrant
of the reconstructed argument ‘‘You should give me a 100 euro note, because I need
100 euros and you have a 100 euro note’’ has the form ‘‘If Ann has a particular
amount of money, then (within reasonable bounds) she should lend it to John, if he
needs it’’. In dialogue 1, John has been able to employ this warrant in a successful
way when advancing his second argument about the 50 euro note.
Consider dialogue 3 of partially successful persuasion which serves as an
example explaining a direction-change of topic t based only on pragmatic
implication:
John_1 Let’s go to the cinema.
Ann_2 No, I don’t feel like going to the cinema. But going to the theatre brings
you closer to the culture as well.
John_3 OK, let’s go to the theatre.
Ann_4 OK.
Assume that ‘‘Let’s go to the cinema’’ is a verbal manifestation of topic t. In this
dialogue, topic t of John becomes a standpoint in move John_1 because positive
attitude to going to the cinema is publicly expressed. Move John_1 can be read also
as expressive of a full argument ‘‘We should go to the cinema because it will bring
me closer to the culture’’. The implicit warrant of the reconstructed argument has
the form ‘‘If a cultural place brings me closer to the culture, then we should go to a
cultural place’’. Ann, in move Ann_2, rejects the proposal of John to go to the
cinema and expresses an argument in favour of going to the theatre. Simultaneously,
in move Ann_2 she refers to the implicit warrant of John’s argument in move 1. To
meet the definition of partially successful persuasion, John and Ann need to agree
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on the version of topic t generated by the implicature arising from the original
standpoint of John and from a prototype topic from the BCM of John. Assume that
going to the theatre is a satisfying and allowable alternative for John, which means
that it is a certain prototype topic belonging to the BCM of John. The implicature
arising from the original standpoint and move Ann_2 is that Ann and John should go
to the theatre. The implicature is a version of original topic t. The agreement of both
agents on the version of topic t is achieved in move Ann_4 where Ann also accepts
the implicit warrant of John’s argument. The persuasion is thus partially successful.
6 Some Features of Partial and Over-Successful Persuasion Dialogues
In this section I will discuss two selected features of the partial and over-successful
persuasion dialogues. The first one is concerned with the activation of a mental topic
in the mind of agent i. The activation of a radial topic by a manifest assumption
cannot contribute to partial and over-successful persuasion for agent i. The
characteristic feature is thus the fact that only the activation of a prototype topic in
the mind of agent i might lead to those types of effects.
Thus, in the case of over-successful persuasion, obtaining more than agent i has
expected does not simply mean that over-success has been achieved by agent i.
Consider dialogue 2 again in which a prototype topic is assumed to be activated in
the mind of John:
John_1 Please lend me 100 euros.
Ann_2 No, I can’t. I have got only a 200 euro note.
John_3 OK, in that case I can take 200 euros.
Ann_4 OK.
Observe that only if obtaining 200 euros is a prototype topic from the BCM of John
(not a radial topic which belongs only to set Tjohn,t) will the implicature arising
from move Ann_2 contribute to the over-successful outcome of the dialogue. If
obtaining 200 euros was not a satisfying alternative for John (e.g., it would be a
problem for him to carry in his wallet more than 100 euros), then it would be treated
as a radial topic which would help John and Ann resolve the difference of opinion
but not in John’s favour. John’s persuasive intention would not be realised.
The activated prototype topic needs to rely on the original topic t and can change
depending on a given dialogue. Assume that we have two dialogues to which the
same Ti,t of agent i involving the same topics {t1,…, t10} pertains. Depending on
the content of topic t and the nature of the conflict, agent i will not consider the same
topics equally satisfying in these two verbal exchanges. In one verbal exchange,
topics {t1, t2, t3} can be considered prototypical by agent i and other topics can be
evaluated as radial. In a different verbal exchange, topics {t2, t10} can be
considered prototypical by agent i and other topics can be treated as radial. Thus, in
the first verbal exchange the implicature needs to emerge from topics {t1} or {t2} or
{t3}, and in the second verbal exchange from either topic {t2} or topic {t10}, to
produce a version of topic t needed for partial and over-success.
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As for the second of these two features of partially and over-successful
persuasion dialogues, this second feature pertains to the particular move in a
dialogue which leads to the activation of a prototype topic. The activated prototype
topic subsequently contributes to the generation of a version of topic t through an
implicature. The significant feature that characterises the move is the fact that the
move might be expressed not only by the opponent of agent i. The implicature might
also arise after the prototype topic is activated by the move of the proponent of the
original standpoint.
In dialogue 3 in the previous section, the prototype topic has been activated by
the move of the opponent. In contrast, in dialogue 4 below, the prototype topic is
activated by move John_3 of the proponent of the original standpoint:
Dialogue 4
John_1 I have said many times that I want a nuclear power station to be built in
Poland.
Ann_2 I definitely don’t want to have it in Poland. The government is considering
building a nuclear power in _Zarnowiec or Choczewo. These are highly
populated areas. If a nuclear power exploded there, then it would pose a
serious threat to the land on which the people live.
John_3 But there are restricted areas in Poland far away from the populated areas.
Ann_4 OK, so let’s built the nuclear power station in these non-populated,
desolate areas in Poland.
Let’s say that ‘‘I want a nuclear power station to be built in Poland’’ is a verbal
manifestation of topic t. In this dialogue, topic t of John becomes a standpoint in
move John_1 because the positive attitude to building a nuclear power station in
Poland is publicly expressed. In move Ann_2, Ann expresses her negative opinion
to topic t and presents an argument justifying her point. Assume that building a
nuclear power station in a non-populated area is an allowable alternative for John to
building the nuclear power station anywhere in Poland and therefore is a certain
prototype topic belonging to the BCM of John. Assume that move John_3 of the
proponent of the original standpoint leads to the activation of the prototype topic
through the manifest fact that there are restricted areas in Poland far away from the
populated areas. Thus, in this dialogue, the move of the proponent of the original
standpoint, not the move of the opponent as was the case in dialogues 1–3, leads to
the activation of the prototype topic in the proponent’s mind.
7 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to offer a supplementary model which provides for
two types of effects of persuasion: partially successful dialogue and over-successful
dialogue. The proposed model introduces the notion of a modified version of the
original topic t which helps to define these two types of effects of the persuasive
force of argument. It has been indicated in what way three relevance-theoretic
notions of cognitive environment, manifest assumption and implicature contribute
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to the explanation of the processes of the generation of the modified version of topic
t. I have introduced what I have called the BCM. It comprises prototype topics
which need to be activated by a manifest assumption to produce an implicature
acting as the modified version of topic t. BCMi,t has been defined as a mental model
belonging to the cognitive environment of agent i which consists of a set of
prototype topics which help agent i resolve the conflict of opinion but only in his
favour. It has been shown that the activation of a prototype topic from a BCMi,t by
the move of agent i or his opponent provides for the discussion of the direction-
change of topic t based on the logical or pragmatic implication.
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